In re Hydrogen Peroxide: Reinforcing Rigorous Analysis
for Class Action Certification
Sarah Rajski†
“[D]enying or granting class certification is often the defining moment in class actions (for it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to
settle nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants).”1

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite district courts defining their own, and often conflicting,
standards for evaluating class certification motions, the Supreme Court
has remained silent on the question of what facts plaintiffs must show in
support of a motion for class action certification.2 Initially, the Supreme
Court noted that “nothing in . . . [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 23] gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry
into the merits of a suit . . . to determine whether it may be maintained as
a class action.” 3 Later, the Supreme Court somewhat clarified its position, stating that a “[c]lass action[] may only be certified if the trial court
is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)
have been satisfied.”4 To complete such a rigorous analysis, the Court
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1. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig. (Hydrogen Peroxide II), 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir.
2008) (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir.
2001)).
2. See In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig. (In re IPO), 471 F.3d 24, 33−34 (2d Cir. 2006).
3. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177−78 (1974). But see Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 (1978) (“[C]lass determination generally involves considerations that are
‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” (quoting Mercantile Nat’l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963))); Livesay, 437 U.S. at 469 n.12 (“The
more complex determinations . . . entail even greater entanglement with the merits.” (quoting 15
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3911, 485 n.45 (1976))).
4. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) (emphasis added).
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continued, it “may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings.”5 But the Supreme Court has failed to provide any further guidance
of what constitutes such a rigorous analysis and the role a court must
take in responding to conflicting expert testimony.6
Recently, the Third Circuit announced a clearly defined rigorous
analysis standard for class certification in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation (In re Hydrogen).7 This standard, outlining a court’s role
and involvement, should be adopted by the Supreme Court. In reversing
certification of a massive class action based on the absence of sufficient
proof, the In re Hydrogen court held that a lower court has not conducted
a rigorous analysis without inquiring into and resolving whether the requirements for class certification were met.8 “Only upon a consideration
of the elements underpinning [a plaintiff’s] . . . claims” can a court determine whether the FRCP 23 requirements for a class action have been
satisfied.9 The In re Hydrogen court’s application is just one example
that illustrates the continuing struggle among courts addressing the requirements of class certification.10
While previous decisions have supported the need for a court to
conduct a thorough examination of each FRCP 23 requirement, only In
re Hydrogen held that a court should address and resolve any conflicting
evidence as to whether the requirements have been satisfied.11 Moreover, in clearly defining this rigorous analysis standard, the Third Circuit
in In re Hydrogen concluded that a court should also evaluate the admissibility of expert testimony when determining whether the plaintiff can
meet FRCP 23 requirements for class certification, even if it leads to
threshold determinations about the credibility of competing expert opinions.12
In In re Hydrogen, direct purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and other chemicals brought an antitrust class action suit against various chemical manufacturers claiming a conspiracy of price-fixing spanning several

5. Id. at 160.
6. See In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 33−34.
7. See Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2008).
8. Id.
9. Principal Brief for Radioshack Corp. Following Order Granting Permission to Appeal
(F.R.C.P. 23(f)) at 40, Kamar v. Radioshack Corp., No. 09-55674 (9th Cir. Apr. 14, 2010) (discussing Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311).
10. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 307; see, e.g., In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 39–40 (2d Cir.
2006); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002); Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,
474 F.3d 1214, 1224–25 (9th Cir. 2007).
11. Jeffrey S. Klein et al., Courts Must Resolve “Battle of the Experts” Before Class Certification, N.Y. L.J., (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9558.
12. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 323.
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years.13 After extensive discovery, the plaintiffs moved to certify the suit
as a class action.14 Despite conflicting expert testimony presented by
both sides regarding the class certification requirements, mainly concerning the predominance requirement—whether the issues common to the
class predominated over individual issues—the district court certified the
class.15 The defendants then appealed the class certification order, arguing that the district court erred by failing to meaningfully consider the
defendants’ expert, applying too lenient of a standard of proof to the
plaintiffs’ expert, and inferring a presumption of impact.16 The Third
Circuit agreed that the district court failed to adequately consider expert
testimony and applied too lenient a proof standard in evaluating the predominance requirement; the court then vacated and remanded the class
certification order.17
In vacating the class certification order, the Third Circuit clarified
three key aspects that courts within its circuit must apply when considering class certification motions.18 First, a court must consider all relevant
evidence and arguments, including expert testimony offered by either
party.19 While this may result in a “battle of the experts” to decide class
certification, the Third Circuit emphasized that conflicting expert testimony, like the other requirements under FRCP 23, must be subject to a
rigorous analysis.20 Therefore, a court must resolve any relevant and
possibly conflicting expert testimony at the certification stage.21
Second, decisions to certify a class action require more than a mere
“threshold showing” that each FRCP 23 requirement is met.22 Rather,
factual determinations supporting each requirement must be based on a
preponderance of the evidence.23 The Third Circuit requires more than
an “intention” to satisfy the procedural requirements: each FRCP 23 requirement must be met, “not just supported by some evidence.”24
13. Id. at 307–08.
14. Id. at 308.
15. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig. (In re Hydrogen), 240 F.R.D. 163, 167 (E.D. Pa.
2007).
16. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 312.
17. Id. at 325–27. The court of appeals held that the district court applied an improperly lenient proof standard and that the district court failed to adequately consider the opinion of the manufacturer’s expert economist. Id. at 323–24.
18. Id. at 307.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 323.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 307.
23. Id. While the Third Circuit’s “preponderance of evidence” requirement involves a higher
showing by the plaintiff, this Comment will not focus exclusively on the burden of proof requirement at the precertification stage.
24. Id. at 321 (quoting In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 33 (2d Cir. 2006)).
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Finally, a court must resolve all factual and legal disputes relevant
to class certification, even if these disputes overlap with the merits of the
claim.25 As noted by the Third Circuit, prior to In re Hydrogen a number of district courts applied a rigorous analysis including preliminary
inquiry into the resolution of conflicting expert testimony as necessary to
evaluate a FRCP 23 requirement.26 But some courts declined to apply
this analysis because of concern for the potential overlap with the merits
of the plaintiffs’ claim. Yet a court must first determine the legal elements of the plaintiffs’ claim before it can determine whether the requirements of FRCP 23 have been met.27 Therefore, in conducting a rigorous analysis, a court must make at least a preliminary decision on the
merits of a case by applying the alleged facts to the legal elements, which
requires more than a court’s determination of whether a legal element of
the plaintiffs’ claim is satisfied.28
Although binding only in the Third Circuit, In re Hydrogen has the
potential to substantially assist other circuit courts and the class certification process in general. The majority opinion was written by Chief
Judge Anthony J. Scirica, a leading civil procedure scholar, who sets
forth a persuasive argument for courts to take a heightened role in promoting efficient use of the legal system and curbing potential abuse of
class actions.29 The Third Circuit provides a clear and concise rigorous
analysis standard for class certification that can easily serve as guidance
for the circuits, in contrast to the Supreme Court’s vague assertions and
repeated avoidance of core FRCP 23 requirements for class certification.30 In light of the current circuit split regarding class certification
requirements and the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clear standard for rigorous analysis, Supreme Court involvement is clearly needed
to address the issue of a court’s involvement and to adopt a reinforced
rigorous analysis standard prior to class certification.
This Comment explores the reasons why the Third Circuit’s high
rigorous analysis standard, which increases a district court’s role in the
class certification process, should be reviewed and adopted by the Su25. Id. at 307.
26. See, e.g., In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d
935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
27. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311; see also Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564
(11th Cir. 1984).
28. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 22, Kamar v. Radioshack Corp., No. 09-55674 (9th Cir. Apr. 14,
2010).
29. Klein et al., supra note 11.
30. Year-End Update on Class Actions: Explosive Growth in Class Actions Continues Despite
Mounting Obstacles to Certification, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER L.L.P. PUBL’NS, Feb.
10, 2009, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Year-EndUpdateOnClass
Actions.aspx.
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preme Court. Part II contains an overview of the history of class actions,
the class certification process, and the procedural requirements under
FRCP 23. Part III analyzes the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard
for certification of a class action and discusses the three standards that
district courts must apply when considering class certification motions.
Part IV explores other relevant federal court class certification decisions,
examines the principal case at odds with the Third Circuit (the Ninth Circuit case Dukes v. Wal-Mart), and explains the need for further Supreme
Court clarification. Part IV also explains why Supreme Court involvement is needed to resolve this class certification issue and why the Court
should adopt the In re Hydrogen rigorous analysis standard. Part V
summarizes this Comment and argues in support of a high rigorous analysis standard for class certification. Part VI concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF CLASS ACTIONS AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. History of Class Actions
A “class action” is a lawsuit in which a group of people with the
same or similar injuries caused by a product, action, or omission sue as a
group.31 The action can be brought by one or more individuals on behalf
of the larger group or the “class.”32 Because many of the individuals’
same or similar injuries may be minor, providing little incentive to pursue legal redress on their own, the value of consolidated claims can be
more attractive than individual lawsuits.33 Moreover, the “promotion of
efficiency and economy of litigation” are well-established as the most
important benefits and goals of a class action suit.34
Class action suits have been popular judicial remedies because they
are viable options for plaintiffs to seek redress. Although class actions
became widely available with the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938 and the enactment of FRCP 23, the use of class
actions in various legal arenas has expanded over the years.35 More recently, plaintiffs’ attorneys have found an incentive to file class actions
because of the potential for multimillion-dollar judgments or settlements

31. Class Action Cases, FINDLAW.COM, http://public.findlaw.com/library/legal-system/classaction-cases.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010).
32. ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY LITIGATION IN A
NUTSHELL 15 (2d ed. 2004).
33. Id. at 11–12; Class Action Cases, supra note 31.
34. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 349 (1983) (discussing American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974)).
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940).
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resulting in large attorney-fee awards that accompany such judgments.36
In connection with the popular class action trend, courts have viewed
their role in managing and monitoring class action suits as an affirmative
function, not only in evaluating class certification but also in administering the litigation once a class has been certified.37 A court’s increased
involvement causes it to evaluate and resolve any conflicts at the precertification stage, which directly corresponds to how much a plaintiff must
demonstrate to meet the FRCP 23 requirements for class certification.38
The federal government also recognized the courts’ heightened role
in class action cases when President George W. Bush signed the Class
Action Fairness Act (the Act) on February 18, 2005.39 In support of an
active court, the Act directs courts to give greater scrutiny to class action
settlements and to limit fees for plaintiffs’ attorneys.40 In addition, the
Act offers greater protection to individual class members, such as consumer protection provisions, which incorporates the idea that justice may
not be served in all class action suits if individuals are not appropriately
compensated for their injuries.41 While protecting individual class members, the Act seeks to prevent plaintiffs of class actions from having unfair bargaining power to force a settlement.42 While class action lawsuits
can help numerous plaintiffs obtain relief for harms that affected a large
group of people who would not otherwise recover, they also run the risk
of abuse by attorneys seeking multimillion-dollar settlements or attorney
fees. Therefore, the tension among these conflicting interests supports
the need for an active court to evaluate the appropriate litigation structure
and then to manage such suits, if certified.
B. FRCP 23 Requirements and Criteria
Recognizing the effectiveness of class action lawsuits, courts have
permitted the use of class actions in various substantive legal areas, such
as defective products, fraud, corporate misconduct, and employment

36. LITTLER MENDELSON, P.C., THE NATIONAL EMPLOYER–2009/2010 EDITION 671 (2009)
(on file with author).
37. Id. at 673.
38. Id.
39. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
40. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712–14 (2006). The Act also provides for federal jurisdiction over certain
state law class actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1712–14.
42. Class Action Fairness Act, § 2. The Act also recognizes the efficient and valuable purpose
served by a class action structure—one of the goals is to provide both plaintiffs and defendants
broader access to federal courts. Id.
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practices.43 But FRCP 23 requires courts to take multiple steps under
subsections (a) and (b) for a case to be certified as a class action.44
In order for a class action to be certified under FRCP 23, four criteria must initially be met under subsection (a).45 First, FRCP 23 requires
numerosity: the proposed class size must be so “numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable.”46 Second, commonality of questions of
law and fact must exist.47 Under the commonality requirement, there
must be “questions of law or fact common to the class,”48 and these issues are such that the “resolution of [them] will advance the litigation.”49
Third, FRCP 23 requires typicality: the “claims or defenses of the representative parties” must be “typical of the claims or defenses of the
class.”50 Fourth, FRCP 23 requires adequacy of representation: a determination that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”51
Once these criteria are satisfied, the plaintiff must also satisfy one
of the three categories of FRCP 23(b) in order for the suit to be certified
as a class action.52 The three categories include: (1) the risk of inconsistent or impaired adjudication; (2) action by the defendant on grounds
generally applicable to the class; and (3) common questions of law or
fact predominate and class resolution is superior to other available methods.53
The requirements of FRCP 23 are fact heavy, which results in
courts having to examine evidence in order to determine whether a class
should be certified.54 But FRCP 23 is silent on which evidence the plaintiffs must show in order to meet the FRCP 23 requirements,55 and the
43. KLONOFF, supra note 32, at 9–10; see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) (noting that class actions did not originate with the adoption of the Federal Rules, but were an “invention
of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable”).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
45. Id. at 23(a).
46. Id. at 23(a)(1); see Paxton v. Union Nat’l Bank, 688 F.2d 552, 559–60 (8th Cir. 1982).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); see Harris v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 661 (N.D. Ill.
1989).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
49. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998).
50. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3); see Sprague, 133 F.3d at 399.
51. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4); see Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d 507, 512
(9th Cir. 1978).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes on 1966
amendments.
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A)–(B), (b)(2). Discussion of the various
elements for each of these categories is beyond the scope of this Comment.
54. In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 40 (2d Cir. 2006).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
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Supreme Court has yet to clarify the matter.56 Through rigorous analysis,
the court must ensure a continuing balance between protecting plaintiffs’
access to the courts and protecting defendants from forced settlements
upon class action certification.
C. The Use of Expert Testimony During the Certification Stage
Both the party seeking class certification and the party opposing
certification often present expert testimony regarding whether the various
FRCP 23 requirements have been met.57 Lower courts have struggled
with the limited and sometimes conflicting Supreme Court guidance on
how to address the FRCP 23 requirements—especially regarding conflicting expert testimony.58 Part of this confusion stems from the
FRCP 23 requirements; for instance, “whether common or individualized
issues predominate can only be made in reference to the legal elements
of the claims.”59 FRCP 23 requires the court to look for commonalities
between the plaintiffs’ claims to determine whether the suit can be certified as a class action.60 Therefore, when a court is looking at the commonalities of the plaintiffs’ claims, it must look at the legal elements of
those claims. These legal elements are often supported by expert testimony. As a result, the court must determine the credibility of the expert
testimony before certifying the class action.
Although it appears that the court’s review of the elements of a
claim would unavoidably involve the merits of the case, the court is not
asked to decide the merits at this stage but, more narrowly, to determine
whether the plaintiffs’ claims support the FRCP 23 requirements. In the
past, many courts refused to make credibility determinations about competing experts’ opinions at the class certification stage.61 Yet it appears
appellate courts have started to resist such a laissez-faire approach and
have more recently required lower courts to evaluate and weigh expert
testimony during the class certification stage, even if weighing the testimony leads the court to make “threshold determination[s]” about the credibility of conflicting expert testimony.62
As noted previously, the Supreme Court has failed to provide any
guidance on what constitutes a rigorous analysis or the role the court
56. See In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 33 n.4.
57. Margaret Lyle & Andrew Wirmani, Courts Deciding Class Certification Must Resolve
“Dueling” Expert Testimony, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/
classactions/class-certification-expert-testimony.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).
58. Id.
59. Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 28, at 22.
60. See Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 1998).
61. Lyle & Wirmani, supra note 57.
62. Lyle & Wirmani, supra note 57.

2011]

Rigorous Analysis for Class Action Certification

585

must take in deciding conflicting expert testimony.63 In light of this lack
of direction from the Supreme Court, district courts have struggled with
the extent of their role during the precertification process.64 Since expert
testimony may focus on almost every element of the plaintiffs’ claim,
from commonality and predominance to proof and damages, clear guidance on how a court should evaluate expert testimony for certification
purposes is necessary. The Third Circuit’s articulation of a clear rigorous analysis standard in In re Hydrogen is an appropriate response to the
struggles of the district courts and further supports the need for Supreme
Court involvement and guidance in the class certification process.65
D. Approaches to Evaluating Expert Testimony
In evaluating expert testimony at the class certification stage, district courts often take one of two approaches. The first approach is to
allow the expert testimony as long as it is not “fatally flawed.”66 In following this approach, many district courts decline to consider whether
the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or whether the plaintiffs would
prevail on the merits of the action.67 Rather, district courts determine
“whether [plaintiffs have] shown, based on a methodology that [is] not
fatally flawed, that the requirements of [FRCP] 23 were met.”68 Courts
often refer to this approach as the “some showing” standard, stating that
the “showing may take the form of, for example, expert opinions, evidence (by document, affidavit, live testimony, or otherwise), or the uncontested allegations of the complaint.”69 Imposing such a low threshold
requirement on plaintiffs’ presentation of expert testimony gives plaintiffs greater bargaining power in settlement negotiations because the suit
is more likely to be certified as a class action under such a lenient approach.
63. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 30–33 n.4.
64. Kenneth Ewing, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Crest of the Wave, 5 CPI ANTITRUST
CHRONICLE (May 14, 2009), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/emhydrogenperoxide-em-the-crest-of-the-wave.
65. This Comment does not focus on whether the circuit split may be resolved through further
rulemaking or legislative action, especially in light of the recent Dukes v. Wal-Mart petition for
certiorari. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W.
3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
66. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig. (Visa Check), 280 F.3d 124, 134–35 (2d
Cir. 2001); see In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 42.
67. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974) (“The question is not whether
the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather, whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met.”).
68. Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 135; see In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 36–38.
69. In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 227 F.R.D. 65, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see Caridad v.
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Visa Check, 280 F.3d at
134–35.
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The second approach courts use to evaluate expert testimony is derived from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.70 The standard announced by the Daubert Court was applied pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 702, which permits an expert to testify “if scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”71 A trial judge
then acts as a “gatekeeper” and must “ensure that any and all scientific
testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”72
Therefore, the expert testimony must rest “on a reliable foundation” and
be “relevant to the task at hand” in order to be admitted.73 While Daubert requires more of a plaintiff in presenting expert testimony, it does
not provide courts specific guidance on how to evaluate reliable, yet conflicting, expert testimony at the class certification stage.
Although both approaches are valuable tools for courts to use in
evaluating and resolving conflicting expert testimony, these approaches
are seldom used in this manner. Lower courts have permitted conflicting
expert testimony to help satisfy class certification requirements as long
as the testimony has met one of the two standards. As set forth by the
Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen, rigorous analysis requires courts to take
their evaluation of expert testimony one step further by tying the information provided by the expert back to the legal elements of the plaintiffs’
claims for class certification.74 In so holding, the Third Circuit asserts
that when a court fails to examine the elements of the claim going to
each FRCP 23 requirement, the court circumvents the rigorous analysis
required and fails to meet its duty at the class certification stage.75
III. HISTORY OF IN RE HYDROGEN PEROXIDE
The Supreme Court previously explained that a district court must
conduct a rigorous analysis of the moving party’s claims to determine
whether the requirements of FRCP 23 can be established.76 The Third
Circuit’s decision in In re Hydrogen helps define the “rigorous analysis”
standard.
70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
71. Id. at 588 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
72. Id. at 589.
73. Id. at 597; see also FED. R. EVID. 702. Hence, if the expert testimony is irrelevant or unreliable, it must be excluded.
74. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 324 (3d Cir. 2008).
75. Id.
76. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 147 (1982) (holding the district court
erred in permitting plaintiff to maintain a failure-to-hire employment class action without any specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact that were common to claims of employee and
of class members the plaintiff sought to represent).
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A. The District Court’s Holding: Intent to Prove
The reasoning of the Third Circuit’s announcement of a clear rigorous analysis standard cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the underlying nature of In re Hydrogen. On January 31, 2005,
direct purchasers of hydrogen peroxide and related chemicals brought an
antitrust action against eighteen hydrogen peroxide manufacturers, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy over eleven years.77 After an investigation
of possible violations of antitrust law in the hydrogen peroxide industry,
multiple class action filings followed.78 The district court consolidated
the cases, resulting in the direct purchaser action where plaintiffs requested to be certified as a class action.79
Pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), plaintiffs claimed that “questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for . . . adjudicating the controversy.”80 As part
of the plaintiffs’ antitrust violation claims, every class member was required to prove at least some antitrust impact resulting from the alleged
violation.81 The court reasoned that “[i]f proof of the essential elements
of the cause of action requires individual treatment, then class certification is unsuitable.”82
The district court found that the plaintiffs satisfied the FRCP 23 requirements for class certification.83 The district court noted that at the
class certification stage, the plaintiffs’ burden is not to prove the elements of antitrust impact, but rather to demonstrate that the elements are
77. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. 163, 166–67 (E.D. Pa. 2007). Hydrogen peroxide, an inorganic liquid, is available in solutions of different concentrations and grades depending on its use. While
all the defendants sold the standard-grade concentration, not all defendants sold all the other available concentration grades in the same amounts. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 307.
78. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 308.
79. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. at 167. Upon transfer to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the court consolidated and divided the cases. Id.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). Predominance and superiority are the dual requirements of FRCP
23(b)(3). Therefore, a class action may be maintained when the questions common to the class
predominate over the questions affecting individual members. Predominance “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 310–11 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)).
81. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311; see also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434,
454 (3d Cir. 1977). The impact element in antitrust cases is often critically important for “evaluating
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement because it . . . may call for individual, as opposed to
common, proof.” Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311; see also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008).
82. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 311 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166 (3d Cir. 2001)). If damages cannot be established through proof
common to the class, but only to individual class members, then the predominance requirement is
not met. Id.
83. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. at 177.
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capable of proof at trial through evidence that is common to the class
rather than individual members.84 Therefore, the key issues at this precertification stage include the district court’s “assessment of the available
evidence and the [method(s)] by which [the] plaintiffs propose to use the
evidence to prove [their claims] at trial.”85
1. Conflicting Expert Testimony
The conflicting expert testimony presented in In re Hydrogen focused on two contentious points: (1) evidence of common proof and (2)
proof of damages.86 The plaintiffs offered the expert opinion and testimony of economist John C. Beyer, Ph.D.87 The defendants offered the
expert opinion of their own economist, Janusz A. Ordover, Ph.D., who
disputed many of Dr. Beyer’s opinions regarding the alleged conspiracy
claim.88
For the first issue of common proof, the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Beyer, claimed that “there is common proof that can be used to demonstrate
that the alleged conspiracy to raise prices, restrict output, and allocate
customers would have impacted all purchasers of hydrogen peroxide . . . .”89 A “market analysis,” according to Dr. Beyer, “suggested that
conditions in the hydrogen peroxide industry favored a conspiracy that
would have impacted the entire class.”90 In response, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to provide proof of damages or impact using evidence common to potential class members.91 Dr. Ordover directly
questioned whether a “formulaic approach exist[ed] by which impact
could be demonstrated and damages to the class could be reasonably calculated.”92
In support of the plaintiffs’ contention that the conspiracy would
have impacted the entire class, Dr. Beyer set out four main arguments.93
First, he asserted that hydrogen peroxide and related chemicals are

84. Id. at 174.
85. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 312.
86. Id. at 312–13.
87. Id. at 312.
88. Id. at 313.
89. Id. at 312.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 314. The defendants’ argument focused on FRCP 23(b)(3)’s requirement that questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate and that the proposed class action be
superior to other available methods. Id. at 310–11.
92. Id. at 313.
93. Id. at 312–13. As discussed above, impact is often important for the purposes of the predominance requirement because it may call for individual, as opposed to common, proof. Id. at 311;
see also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008).
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“fungible, undifferentiated commodity products.”94 Second, Dr. Beyer
stated that hydrogen peroxide “production is heavily concentrated in a
small group of manufacturers.”95 Third, he argued that the “high barriers
[of] entry in[to] the industry and no close economic substitutes[] prevent[ed] . . . competitors from entering the market[] and undercutting
prices.”96 Finally, according to Dr. Beyer, the manufacturers’ markets
“overlapped, so that purchasers would have benefitted from price competition if not for the alleged conspiracy.”97 Dr. Beyer also contended that
a “pricing structure” in the hydrogen peroxide industry existed, which
further suggested a “conspiracy [that] would have impacted all class
members.”98
But Dr. Ordover disputed Dr. Beyer’s finding that hydrogen peroxide is fungible and argued that an individualized assessment of the impact on an alleged conspiracy was required.99 Moreover, Dr. Ordover
presented evidence that common proof was not available to all class
members and claimed that Dr. Beyer only “promised” to overcome the
obstacle of explaining common proof without showing or even suggesting how such method might be proved.100
For the second contested issue regarding proof of damages,
Dr. Beyer identified two “potential approaches” for estimating damages
on a class-wide basis: benchmark and regression analyses.101 Dr. Beyer
did not take into account individual transaction prices in either approach
but relied instead on list-price-increase announcements and average prices.102 He contended that either method “could be used to estimate the
prices plaintiffs would have faced but for the conspiracy” and that “sufficient reliable data” existed to allow the completion of one or both of the
potential approaches.103 Finally, Dr. Beyer generally stated that the
benchmark analysis and the regression analysis were two approaches that
could be used to provide an estimate of damages if the suit was certified

94. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 312. This means “producers compete[d] on price, not
quality or other features.” Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 312–13.
97. Id. at 313.
98. Id. Dr. Beyer claimed that this pricing structure existed because prices across producers,
grades, concentrations, and end uses “moved similarly over time.” Id.
99. Id. at 313–14. Dr. Ordover claimed that the various grades had different supply characteristics and, thus, different demand requirements. Id. at 313.
100. Id. at 314.
101. Id. at 313.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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as a class action, but he did not provide any particular formula or process
to prove common impact in the instant case.104
In response, Dr. Ordover asserted that the statistical methods
Dr. Beyer proposed to demonstrate common impact and damages were
not feasible; rather, a case-by-case inquiry was needed to determine price
fluctuations for any class member.105 In addition to presenting Dr. Ordover’s testimony, the defendants moved to exclude the affidavit and
testimony of Dr. Beyer as unreliable under Daubert.106 Because the
plaintiffs’ analysis of FRCP 23(b) factors depended largely on Dr. Beyer’s affidavit, the district court had to first resolve the motion to exclude
the testimony, as well as the “irreconcilable” expert analyses presented
by the parties.107 After consideration, the district court ultimately denied
the defendants’ motion.108
2. Summary of the District Court’s Reasoning
The district court based its reasoning on two underlying considerations: the preponderance of the evidence and the credibility of experts.
First, the district court found the predominance requirement was satisfied
because the plaintiffs’ “market analysis” and “pricing structure” analysis
were sufficiently independent, and the plaintiffs were not required to
produce any further evidence in support of a motion for class certification.109 In finding that the predominance requirement was met, the district court permitted the plaintiffs to use common, as opposed to individualized, evidence to prove antitrust impact at trial.110
Next, in consideration of the defendants’ Daubert motion to exclude Dr. Beyer’s testimony, the district court noted that the evidence
was being offered for the limited purpose of class certification; therefore,
the court’s “inquiry is perhaps less exacting than it might be for evidence . . . presented at trial.”111 The district court found, rather narrowly,

104. Id. at 314.
105. Id. Dr. Ordover disputed Dr. Beyer’s price-structuring analysis and presented further
evidence that list prices were not reliable and that the use of average prices by Dr. Beyer did not
reflect average customer prices. Additionally, Dr. Ordover asserted that there was a tendency for
prices charged to individuals to move together, which indicated that the alleged conspiracy could not
be shown to have a class-wide impact. Id.
106. Id. at 314–15.
107. Id. at 315; In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. 163, 170 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
108. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 315.
109. Id.
110. Id. Additionally, the district court concluded that hydrogen peroxide is fungible and
rejected the defendants’ objections to this finding of fungibility. Id.
111. In re Hydrogen, 240 F.R.D. at 170. The district court continued: “To preclude such evidence at the class certification stage, it must be shown that the opinion is the kind of ‘junk science’
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that Dr. Beyer’s qualifications met the two evidence requirements: the
witness possessed “specialized knowledge” and demonstrated “reliability
and fit.”112
The court also found that the plaintiffs’ proposed methods were sufficient for proving impact and damages.113 Although Dr. Beyer did not
complete any specific analysis, the district court allowed his use of general analyses at the precertification stage.114 The district court rejected
the defendants’ attack on the reliability of Dr. Beyer’s methods, while
acknowledging that the defendants’ own expert reached a different conclusion.115 Moreover, the district court refused to require the plaintiffs to
demonstrate that either of their proposed methods would work at the
class certification stage; rather, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’
intention to prove a significant portion of their case through factual evidence and legal arguments common to all class members was sufficient.116
Finally, the district court refused to “weigh the relative credibility
of the parties’ experts” because requiring the court to choose between
opinions of battling experts would take a vital piece of fact-finding away
from the jury.117 But the court then stated that at the precertification
stage of the suit, it was not concerned with whether it found the plaintiffs’ evidence convincing because the persuasiveness of the evidence
was a question for the jury.118 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs
“need only make a threshold showing that the element of impact will
predominantly involve generalized issues of proof, rather than questions
which are particular to each member of the class.”119 By relying on
plaintiffs’ intentions to prove their claims with generalized expert testithat a Daubert inquiry at this preliminary stage ought to screen.” Id. (quoting In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 217 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2001)).
112. Id. at 170–71. “Reliability is a question of whether the ‘opinion is based on valid reasoning and reliable methodology.’” Id. at 171 (quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l, Inc., 128 F.3d
802, 806 (3d Cir. 1997)). “The question of fit requires us to assess the Rule 702 requirement that ‘the
expert’s testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must assist the trier of fact.’” Id.
(quoting Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003)).
113. Id. at 175.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 171. The defendants specifically attacked Dr. Beyer’s methods to reveal an industry-wide pricing structure. Id.
116. Id. at 170.
117. Id. at 171. The court believed that “plaintiffs would be able to show antitrust impact on
all purchasers merely by showing that defendants kept list prices that were artificially high because
of their conspiracy.” Id. at 174.
118. Id. at 174 n.16.
119. Id. at 174 (quoting Lumco Indus., Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 171 F.R.D. 168, 174 (E.D. Pa.
1997)). Moreover, the court did not address the defendants’ expert’s reports in determining whether
the FRCP 23 requirements were met. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 322 (3d Cir. 2008).
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mony, the court fell short of undergoing the rigorous analysis required to
determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims could be collectively adjudicated. The district court then went on to grant the plaintiffs’ motion to
certify the suit as a class action.120
B. The Third Circuit’s Rigorous Analysis for Class Certification
On appeal of the district court’s determination to certify the class,
the In re Hydrogen defendants claimed that the district court applied too
lenient of a standard of proof, failed to consider the defendants’ expert
with any significant weight, and applied an erroneous presumption of
antitrust impact.121 Specifically, the defendants contended that the district court erred “by (1) accepting only a ‘threshold showing’ by plaintiffs, . . . (2) requiring only that plaintiffs demonstrate their ‘intention’ to
prove impact on a class-wide basis, and (3) singling out antitrust actions
as appropriate for class treatment even when compliance with [FRCP] 23
is ‘in doubt.’”122
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted
review to consider “the standards a district court applies when deciding
whether to certify a class” under FRCP 23.123 Ultimately, the Third Circuit found the district court erred in two ways: (1) it failed to meaningfully consider the views of the defendants’ expert while crediting the
plaintiffs’ expert, and (2) it applied too lenient of a standard of proof for
class certification.124 The Third Circuit then explained that a lower court
“must make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary [to] consider all relevant evidence and arguments presented by the parties.”125
The court noted that the party seeking certification must convince a district court that the FRCP 23 requirements are met, but it also acknowledged that little guidance is available on the “proper standard of ‘proof’
for class certification.”126
The Third Circuit clarified “three key aspects” for district courts to
apply when considering class certification motions.127 First, a district
court is obligated to consider all relevant evidence and arguments, which
includes expert testimony offered by either the party seeking or opposing

120. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 322.
121. Id. at 312.
122. Id. at 315.
123. Id. at 307.
124. Id. at 321–22.
125. Id. at 307.
126. Id. at 315–16. The Third Circuit reiterated the well-established rule that a class may not
be certified without a finding that each FRCP 23 requirement is met. Id. at 310.
127. Id. at 307.

2011]

Rigorous Analysis for Class Action Certification

593

class certification.128 Therefore, a district court’s assumption that it is
not permitted to weigh expert opinions presented by the parties is erroneous.129 Rather, for class certification, when confronted with expert
opinions, district courts must undergo the “rigorous analysis” required
under FRCP 23.130 The Third Circuit then rejected the Daubert standard
as the sole standard for an expert opinion when determining if class certification is appropriate.131 In addition to applying the Daubert standard,
the district court must be persuaded by the expert opinion, regardless of
whether that inquiry implicates the expert’s credibility.132 The Third
Circuit noted that “[w]eighing conflicting expert testimony at the [class]
certification stage is not only permissible [but] it may be integral to the
rigorous analysis [FRCP] 23 demands.”133
Second, the Third Circuit concluded that “the district court must
find that the evidence more likely than not establishes each fact necessary to meet the requirements of [FRCP] 23.”134 The Third Circuit emphasized that the FRCP 23 requirements are not “mere pleading rules.”135
A district court must “delve beyond the pleadings to determine whether
the requirements for class certification are satisfied.”136 A “threshold
showing” by the party seeking class certification is “inadequate”; such
factual determinations must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.137 Under this second requirement, the Third Circuit rejected the
district court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ intention to prove impact
through common evidence was sufficient and stated that a party’s “assurance to the court that it intends or plans to meet the [FRCP 23] requirements” is insufficient.138
Third, the Third Circuit held that a district court “must resolve . . . legal disputes relevant to class certification, even if [the disputes] overlap with the merits—including [those] touching on elements
of the cause of action.”139 The Third Circuit’s conclusion stemmed from
128. Id.
129. Id. at 322.
130. Id. at 323.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 324.
133. Id. at 323. Interestingly, on appeal, the Third Circuit noted that “Beyer’s and Ordover’s
analyses are irreconcilable.” Id. at 314.
134. Id. at 320. In addition, the Third Circuit discouraged the district court’s use of the term
“threshold showing” because it could imply a more lenient standard for the party seeking certification, which the Third Circuit rejected. Id. at 321.
135. Id. at 316 (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154,
167 (3d Cir. 2001)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 320–21.
138. Id. at 318.
139. Id. at 307.
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the Supreme Court’s directive in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, which
provided that there is “nothing in either the language or history of
[FRCP] 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be
maintained as a class action.”140 Yet, the Third Circuit explained that
“Eisen is best understood to preclude only a merits inquiry that is not
necessary to determine a [FRCP] 23 requirement.”141 It further explained
that “overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of
a claim is no reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class certification requirement is met.”142
Because the plaintiffs had the burden to demonstrate that the element of impact was capable of proof at trial through evidence common to
the class, the Third Circuit stated that expert testimony “calls for the district court’s rigorous assessment of the available evidence and the method or methods by which plaintiffs propose to use the evidence to prove
impact at trial.”143 Therefore, a district court “errs as a matter of law”
when it does not resolve a factual dispute relevant to the FRCP 23 requirements.144
Hence, by failing to resolve such a factual dispute, district courts
risk erroneously certifying a class action when class certification may not
be the best form of adjudication to ensure justice for both parties. By
prematurely certifying a class, the court gives the plaintiffs significant
power over the suit—especially the settlement—which may not result in
fairness for all parties involved given related concerns about remedies.
A court, by resolving conflicting information regarding the legal elements of the plaintiffs’ claim at the precertification stage through a rigorous analysis, ensures protection for the defendants while allowing
plaintiffs, who could not bring their claims otherwise, access to the
courts.
IV. CIRCUIT SPLITS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF A
HIGH RIGOROUS ANALYSIS STANDARD
The Third Circuit’s decision in In re Hydrogen not only articulates
the highest rigorous analysis standard for class certification to date but
also highlights the inconsistency of class certification standards among
140. Id. at 316–17 (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974)). Eisen
involved a class action by odd-lot traders against brokerage firms and the New York Stock Exchange
for alleged violations of antitrust and securities laws. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 156.
141. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 317.
142. Id. at 316.
143. Id. at 312.
144. Id. at 320.
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the various circuit courts. In the last thirty-five years, the Supreme Court
has decided fewer than a dozen cases involving core class certification
issues that address the procedural aspects of FRCP 23, expert testimony
related to the FRCP 23 requirements, and the level of the court’s role in
determining class certification. Despite deciding other class action issues
in various areas of law,145 the Supreme Court has neither expanded upon
nor provided further clarification regarding its ambiguous statement that
“[c]lass certification is proper only ‘if the trial court is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites’ of [FRCP] 23 are met.”146
The In re Hydrogen decision supports the “growing consensus”147
that the scope of class certification inquiry is broad and FRCP 23 requires district courts to conduct a rigorous analysis that must include a
preliminary inquiry of merit issues.148 Yet, while courts may be moving
away from a lenient standard of review, a clear split regarding the level
of court involvement exists. The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split in order to curb misuse of class action suits by plaintiffs and to
protect the interests of defendants. This section provides an overview of
relevant circuit court decisions, contrasts the principal case at odds with
In re Hydrogen, Dukes v. Wal-Mart, and discusses possible implications
of the Third Circuit’s high rigorous analysis standard.
A. Relevant Circuit Court Decisions
While other circuit courts have attempted to define and strengthen
the parameters of the rigorous analysis standard, the Third Circuit
adopted the highest rigorous analysis standard yet for class certification,
which built upon a prior Second Circuit decision, In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation (In re IPO).149 Following the lead of the
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit

145. Marcia Coyle, Class Action Fairness Act Achieves Goal, but With a Catch, NAT’L L.J.,
Feb. 13, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202428246880; see also Year-End Update on
Class Actions, supra note 30 (such areas of law include tax law, ERISA, Title VII, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act). For a review of prior Supreme Court decisions, see, for example, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (notice to class members); Gulf Oil Co. v.
Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981) (limits on communication with unnamed members of class); Gen. Tel.
Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982) (typicality); Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867 (1984) (res judicata); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985)
(choice of law); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (settlement class actions);
and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999) (“limited fund” class actions).
146. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 309 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at
161).
147. Klein et al., supra note 11.
148. See, e.g., In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006); West v. Prudential Sec., Inc, 282 F.3d
935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002).
149. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41.
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in In re IPO held “that a district court may and, depending on the case,
must, consider and determine questions relating to the merits of a
case”150 and rejected the more lenient standard of proof.151
Prior to In re Hydrogen, In re IPO exemplified the general consensus among circuit courts, which adopted a moderate view of the rigorous
analysis standard. The Second Circuit’s view, as consistent with the other moderate circuits, generally discouraged district courts from turning
class certification into a “mini-trial” and did not apply the exact preponderance of the evidence standard.152 Yet, the Second Circuit held that
before certifying a class action, a district court must make a “definitive
assessment” of the class requirements, and the court’s obligation to
“make such determinations is not lessened by overlap between a
[FRCP] 23 requirement and a merits issue.”153 Finally, the Second Circuit noted that any determination of the FRCP 23 requirements was only
for purposes of class certification and is not binding on the trier of fact.154
Although the Second Circuit in In re IPO expanded the district court’s
role in class certification, it failed to take the final step set forth in In re
Hydrogen—that a court should not just weigh but also resolve any conflicting evidence or expert testimony at the precertification stage.
1. Principal Case at Odds: Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Imagine yourself as the in-house counsel of a growing corporation
who was just notified that a court certified a class action lawsuit involving alleged discriminatory practices based on excessive subjectivity by
various store managers. While the sheer size of the class and potential
financial impact on the company are intimidating and quite frightening,
the suit is ominous for several other reasons.155
First, the court certified the class based on the plaintiffs’ mere intention to prove the class requirements, despite acknowledgments that
150. Joel Haims, Matthew D’Amore & Mark David McPherson, United States: Second Circuit
Decision Clarifies the Standards for Class Certification, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Dec. 15, 2006,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=45000; see e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.
2001); Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 2005); Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
564 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009).
151. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41. In In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litigation, 544 F.3d 474,
484 (2d Cir. 2008), a securities class action, the Second Circuit continued down the path of requiring
plaintiffs to establish, through evidentiary showings at the class certification stage, that the FRCP 23
factors are satisfied.
152. In re IPO, 471 F.3d at 41.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Dukes), 474 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007). Note that this
hypothetical fact pattern is based on Wal-Mart’s current case. Id.

2011]

Rigorous Analysis for Class Action Certification

597

much of the sociology expert’s opinion was conjecture. Additionally, the
court’s avoidance in resolving the conflicting expert testimony at the
precertification stage reduces available litigation strategies. Once the
plaintiffs’ class has been certified as a class action, it appears that the
defendants only have two options: attempt to contest the class certification through costly, time-consuming litigation or initiate settlement discussions. Defending the class action with the potential for massive financial liability, not to mention reputational harm, does not appear to be
a possibility at this point.
In reality, the nation’s largest employer currently faces a similar
situation in Dukes v. Wal-Mart (Dukes), where the Ninth Circuit recently
affirmed the district court’s decision to certify the class.156 Although a
district court has broad discretion in certifying a class action, the Dukes
decision highlights the need for a court’s heightened role in performing a
rigorous analysis, especially when conflicting expert testimony is presented.157 Without this rigorous analysis by courts, plaintiffs, such as
those in Dukes, are given tremendous bargaining power at the certification stage whether or not the legal elements of their claims have been or
may be satisfied if the suit continues.
Not all courts have followed the trend toward applying a high rigorous analysis standard for class certification.158 Dukes is an example
of a court confusing the merits of the case as applied to the facts versus
determining the procedural FRCP 23 elements needed for the plaintiffs’
claim as part of the court’s rigorous analysis. The Dukes court allowed
the largest class action case in history to proceed without any resolution
of the highly conflicting expert testimony on whether the FRCP 23 requirements had been satisfied.
In Dukes, six female employees who were allegedly subjected to
Wal-Mart’s systematic discriminatory pay and promotion policies
brought suit under Title VII on behalf of all other similarly situated
women at Wal-Mart.159 The district court in Dukes, as affirmed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, permitted class certification based on the plaintiffs’ intention to prove their claims, without

156. Wal-Mart recently filed a petition for certiorari on August 25, 2010. Dukes v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No.
10-277). According to the Supreme Court’s online docket for Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Case
No. 10-277, the plaintiffs’ response to Wal-Mart’s petition was due on September 24, 2010.
157. See Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1214.
158. Id. at 1222–23; Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010).
159. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1222. The potential class is composed of as many as 1.5 million
women currently or formerly employed by Wal-Mart in its 3,400 stores in 41 regions of the United
States. Id.
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requiring the plaintiffs to actually prove their claims. Additionally, the
court failed to examine or resolve the conflicting expert testimony.160
The class in Dukes was certified pursuant to FRCP 23 because the
court found that questions of law or fact common to the class members
predominated over any questions involving only individual members.161
Both parties appealed but for different reasons.162 Specifically, WalMart, the largest private employer in the United States, argued that the
plaintiffs’ evidence—expert opinions, statistical evidence, and anecdotal
evidence—was not sufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.163
Further, Wal-Mart contended that because of the subjective decision
making of managers regarding pay and promotions, the district court’s
finding of commonality could not be supported.164
In a two-to-one decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the class certification, resulting in the largest gender-discrimination case in United
States history.165 The appellate court found that the district court acted
within its broad discretion by properly considering expert opinions from
the plaintiffs’ sociologist and statistician that were offered to show commonality.166 While other circuits have not typically approved social
science testimony, the Ninth Circuit permitted the sociological expert’s
testimony by stating that the expert had a “reliable basis” to satisfy Daubert.167 The court then accepted the opinions of the plaintiffs’ sociology
expert despite acknowledging the opinions lacked certainty. The Ninth
Circuit further reasoned that “social science statistics may add probative
value to plaintiffs’ class action claims.”168
The Ninth Circuit rejected Wal-Mart’s assertion that the plaintiffs’
sociological expert did not meet the necessary standards for experts under Daubert. Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court’s reasoning that the “necessary standards” argument went to the weight of the
expert opinion, not its admissibility.169 The Ninth Circuit also rejected
160. Id. at 1222–23.
161. Id. at 1231. The district court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification. In response to Wal-Mart’s challenges to the evidence, the court responded that
the “objections are predominantly of the type that go to the weight of the evidence, and thus should
properly be addressed by a jury considering the merits.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D.
137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
162. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1223. The content of the plaintiffs’ appeal is outside the scope of this
Comment.
163. Id. at 1222–33. While Wal-Mart did not contest the numerosity requirement, it did challenge the remaining requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Id.
164. Id. at 1231.
165. Id. at 1244.
166. Id. at 1231.
167. Id. at 1227.
168. Id.
169. Id.

2011]

Rigorous Analysis for Class Action Certification

599

Wal-Mart’s claims that the district court should have taken into account
Wal-Mart’s statistical expert testimony and found that the employees
exceeded the permissive and minimal burden of establishing commonality through significant evidence.170 The Dukes decision emphasized a
court’s lenient and limited role by stating that the weight of evidence,
like the merits of the claims, were not to be considered at the class certification stage.171 Plainly, the Dukes decision is in direct conflict with the
In re Hydrogen decision and fails to follow the general trend of circuit
courts that support at least some form of examination into the weight of
evidence offered at the precertification stage.
2. Dissent in Dukes v. Wal-Mart: Class Certification Improper
Judge Andrew J. Kleinfeld’s dissenting opinion in Dukes, from the
two-judge majority opinion, is more consistent with the Second and
Third Circuit views adopting a court’s increased role in the precertification process. Judge Kleinfeld believed that the plaintiffs failed to meet
the FRCP 23 requirements; thus, class certification was improper.172 In
arguing that class certification in this case would harm both parties in the
lawsuit, Judge Kleinfeld commented that he would require the district
court to conduct a more in-depth analysis of the evidence to ensure that
the FRCP 23 requirements are met.173 In doing so, a district court judge
“must make a ‘definitive assessment of [the FRCP] 23 requirements,
notwithstanding their overlap with merit issues’ and ‘must receive
enough evidence . . . to be satisfied that each [FRCP] 23 requirement has
been met.’”174
In addition to disputing the majority’s finding of commonality,
Judge Kleinfeld disagreed with the majority’s finding on damages.175
The district court had rejected Wal-Mart’s objections to permitting an
inference that it engaged in discriminatory practices based on the plain170. Id. at 1229–30. The court found the plaintiffs’ statistical expert report (examined data at a
regional level) to be more probative than Wal-Mart’s statistical expert (examined data on a storedepartment level). Id. at 1229, 1231. The evidence provided by both parties focused on companywide corporate practices and policies, statistical evidence of gender disparities caused by discrimination, and anecdotal evidence of gender bias. Id. at 1225–31.
171. Id. at 1227.
172. Id. at 1244 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1245. Judge Kleinfeld commented that both parties would be harmed by violating
the rights of the women injured and by violating Wal-Mart’s constitutional due process rights. Id. at
1244.
174. Id. at 1245 (quoting In re IPO, 471 F.3d 24, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2006)).
175. Id. at 1248. Judge Kleinfeld concluded that there were no “questions of law or fact common to the class” and that the “class lacked ‘typicality’ because the claims or defenses of the representative parties [were] not typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Id. at 1245–46 (quoting
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3)).
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tiffs’ evidence.176 In permitting such an inference, the district court believed the information went to the weight of the evidence, rather than the
validity; thus, the evidence should be addressed by a jury at the merit
phase of the case.177
While the Dukes decision is deeply concerning to both defendants’
counsel and various circuit courts, it appears the Ninth Circuit also recognized the significant impact of the case when later granting WalMart’s petition for rehearing. After the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel
affirmed the district court’s determination to certify the class on February
6, 2007,178 Wal-Mart promptly filed for a rehearing en banc, contending
that the majority committed legal error with regard to whether the
grounds for class action certification had been met.179 On December 11,
2007, the same Ninth Circuit panel withdrew its initial opinion and issued a subsequent, superseding opinion that still permitted the class certification.180 Wal-Mart again filed for a rehearing en banc.181 Subsequently, on February 13, 2009, the Ninth Circuit again granted Wal-Mart’s
petition for a rehearing en banc on the issue of class action certification.182
B. Ninth Circuit Upholds Certification of the Largest Nationwide Class
in Dukes v. Wal-Mart
On April 26, 2010, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion by certifying a class of approximately 1.5 million
female Wal-Mart employees.183 In the 6–5 en banc ruling, the court of
appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part, the class
certification order.184 “[T]he Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district
court’s ruling that, although enormous, the class was nonetheless manageable for trial, and that certification did not violate Wal-Mart’s statutory
176. Id. at 1225 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1222, withdrawn and superseded by 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
179. Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc. (Dukes II), 509 F.3d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir. 2007).
180. Id. The panel dismissed the original petition for rehearing in light of its superseding opinion on the grounds that the revised opinion addresses the legal errors claimed in the petition.
Among other changes, the Ninth Circuit altered its original opinion regarding admissibility of expert
testimony and the use of Daubert challenges during a motion for class certification. Id. at 1178–80.
181. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 556 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2009).
182. Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s December 2007 opinion was no longer effective.
183. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. (Dukes III), 603 F.3d 571, 615 (9th Cir. 2010). The class
potentially includes all female employees who were employed by Wal-Mart when the lawsuit was
filed in 2001 with respect to their claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay resulting from allegations of gender discrimination. Id. at 577.
184. Id. While the discussion of the appellate court’s finding related to damages is outside the
scope of this Comment, the court reversed and remanded the district court’s certification of the employees’ claims for punitive damages. Id.
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and due process right to defend against each individual claim of discrimination.”185
Circuit Judge Sandra Ikuta, joined by four other judges including
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, authored the dissent, which emphasized the
divided court.186 The dissenting opinion begins with the following
statement:
No court has ever certified a class like this, until now. And with
good reason. In this case, six women who have worked in thirteen
of Wal-Mart’s 3,400 stores seek to represent every woman who has
worked in those stores over the course of the last decade—a class
estimated in 2001 to include more than 1.5 million women.187

The dissent asserted that the district court abused its discretion in two
ways: (1) “it failed to follow the Supreme Court’s direction to ‘evaluate
carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff’s plea that he is a proper
class representative under 23(a),’ and to ensure ‘after a rigorous analysis’
that the prerequisites of [FRCP] 23(a) have been met”188 and (2) “it erred
in ignoring Wal-Mart’s statutory right to raise defenses to liability for
back pay and punitive damages under Title VII . . . and therefore abused
its discretion in holding that the proposed class could be certified under
[FRCP] 23(b)(2).”189
The dissent stated that the plaintiffs failed to present “significant
proof” of a discriminatory practice or policy that Wal-Mart engaged in,
which would make it possible for such a large class of female employees
to have suffered similar discrimination.190 The dissent expressed concern
about the majority’s conclusion that courts are not bound by Falcon’s
“significant proof” requirement. The dissent stated that, although the
plaintiffs are not required to prove the merits of their claim, Falcon does
require the plaintiffs to put forth some significant proof more than mere
allegations that a general policy of discrimination exists.191 Thus, the
dissent would require more from plaintiffs before a class of that size is
certified.192
Additionally, the dissent favorably cited In re Hydrogen to support
its argument that the Daubert standard for testimony is to be similarly
185. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores: En Banc Ninth Circuit Drastically Lowers the Bar for Class
Certification, MAYER BROWN LEGAL UPDATE, May 3, 2010, at 2, available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8939.
186. Dukes III, 603 F.3d at 628 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 631 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982)).
189. Id. (internal citations omitted).
190. Id. at 628; see Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982).
191. Dukes III, 603 F.3d at 632; see also Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw., 457 U.S. at 159 n.15.
192. Dukes III, 603 F.3d at 634.
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applied to both class certification as well as expert testimony relevant at
trial: “Expert opinion with respect to class certification, like any matter
relevant to a [FRCP] 23 requirement, calls for rigorous analysis.”193
Wal-Mart’s lead appellate counsel, Theodore Boutros, Jr., indicated
that Wal-Mart would appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and stated that
the decision violates “both due process and federal class action rules,
contradicting numerous decisions of other federal appellate courts and
the Supreme Court itself.”194 Subsequently, Wal-Mart filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court. On December 6, 2010, the Supreme
Court granted the writ of certiorari and directed the parties to argue
whether the class certification ordered under FRCP 23(b)(2) was consistent with FRCP 23(a).195 As in other stages of this litigation, it is likely
that amicus briefs will be filed on behalf of both parties to represent the
wide variety of interests and areas that are affected by this decision, such
as other employers with stores across the country.
C. Possible Implications of a Clearly Defined Rigorous Standard
The clearly-articulated rigorous analysis standard for class certification by the Third Circuit in In re Hydrogen has the potential for many
wide-ranging effects in the world of class action litigation. The Third
Circuit opinion makes clear that its holding applies across all substantive
areas of the law and is not limited solely to antitrust actions.196 Therefore, the Third Circuit’s decision will affect class action trial strategy for
both plaintiffs and defendants. Although the Third Circuit’s rigorous
analysis standard appears beneficial to defendants, the effects of this
holding are offset by certain advantages to plaintiffs.
In “many cases, once a class has been certified[,] the defendant
must settle, while[,] if no class is certified, the plaintiff [may have] neither the incentive nor the practical ability to maintain the lawsuit.”197
193. Id. at 639 (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 323 (3d Cir. 2008)).
194. Tresa Baldas, Wal-Mart Yells ‘Supreme Court’ after 9th Circuit Certifies Largest Civil
Class Action Ever, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=12
02453222347&WalMart_yells_Supreme_Court_after_th_Circuit_certifies_largest_civil_class_actio
n_ever&hbxlogin=1. Wal-Mart filed a petition for certiorari on August 25, 2010, No. 10-277, with
the following questions for the Court: (1) whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under
FRCP 23(b)(2) and, if so, under what circumstances and (2) whether the lower court’s order certifying a class conforms to the requirements of Title VII, the Due Process Clause, the Seventh Amendment, the Rules Enabling Act, and FRCP 23? Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Pending Petition, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/wal-mart-v-dukes (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
195. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W.
3128 (U.S. Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-277).
196. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 321 (3d Cir. 2008).
197. Donald M. Falk & Fatima Goss Graves, Federal Court Ruling Undermines Defendants’
Ability to Appeal Class Action Certifications, 20 LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (2005).
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Therefore, if a trial court fails to resolve conflicting testimony as established by the Third Circuit, plaintiffs who present expert testimony with
only the “intent” to prove the FRCP 23 requirements will have an unfair,
highly influential advantage over defendants. Before the Third Circuit’s
decision, plaintiffs may have sought to bring their motion for class certification—the defining moment of the case—early on in the litigation,
thereby prematurely sounding the “death knell of the litigation[,] . . . irrespective of the merits of the claims.”198 Plaintiffs who prevail on the issue of class certification can often force defendants into a
strategic settlement rather than risk the potential exposure of facing a
jury.
Once a class action is certified, a defendant may not be able to
present individual defenses and, instead, may wage a statistical war with
the other side—the outcome of which will be decided by jurors who lack
the statistical acumen to understand the statistical nuances.199 Without a
clearly-defined rigorous analysis standard, courts may permit hundreds
or even millions of plaintiffs (such as in Dukes) to join class action suits
without giving defendants the opportunity to address individual claims
on the merits, which is akin to denying the defendants due process.200
Such class actions are really no more than “corporate shakedowns” with
the companies’ employees and stockholders, and everyone as consumers
paying the price.201 As a result, the Third Circuit provides an appropriate
balance between preserving the plaintiffs’ rights to bring class action
suits to seek redress and protecting defendants from frivolous class actions.
Although the issue of damages is beyond the scope of this Comment, some courts have questioned whether the plaintiffs would adequately represent the interests of the class by foregoing class certification
on damages.202 Additionally, violations of the defendants’ due process
rights may occur if money is taken from the defendants and given to undeserving individuals, such as uninjured class action members. Certain
damages calculations, such as punitive damages, are determined without
consideration of individual entitlement. Such a calculation should be
198. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 310 (citations omitted) (quoting Newton v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)).
199. Jim Copland, These Actions Have No Class, MANHATTAN INST. FOR POL’Y RES., Sept.
15, 2004, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_sfe-these_actions.htm.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 582–83 (7th ed. 2009) (“[E]ven assuming that the district court could conduct an initial
bench trial on the merits of the equitable claims, and that the court actually found in favor of the
plaintiffs, it would still be necessary for a single jury to hear and rule on more than 2000 individual
claims for compensatory damages.” (quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 722 (11th Cir. 2004))).
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proportionate to actual personal damages; however, when a case has
been certified as a class action, the court is unaware of personal damages
in the absence of individual determination.203 Conversely, formulas for
damages can also hurt the plaintiffs if uninjured individuals not entitled
to compensation are awarded damages. Often these undeserving plaintiffs are lumped into the class action without individual determinations
and, as a result, the parties truly injured by the defendant are awarded
less in damages.
Accordingly, litigating merit issues at the precertification stage carries with it risks and strategic implications for both defendants and plaintiffs.204 Although a district court must decide only those “merit issues
necessary to deciding class certification, in practice, rulings against defendants on disputed merits issues at the class certification stage may
nonetheless negatively slant the court on such issues going forward in a
case.”205 Further, under this clearly-defined rigorous analysis standard,
plaintiffs may be reluctant to file a motion for class certification earlier in
the process because they must produce expert evidence that satisfies the
burden of proof under the FRCP 23 requirements. Requiring plaintiffs to
prove more of their case at the precertification stage limits their access to
the judicial system; however, plaintiffs must prove these necessary elements later in the suit in order to succeed. Therefore, the rigorous analysis standard requires the plaintiff to prove the FRCP 23 requirements at
an earlier stage of the case, and it does not place any undue burden on the
plaintiff that is not currently required.
While the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard appears to be
beneficial to defendants, the increased discovery prior to class certification may outweigh the benefits of a more involved court. The Third Circuit’s standard is advantageous for defendants because plaintiffs must
persuade the court that their expert’s opinion satisfies FRCP 23, rather
than put forward a competent expert that merely passes the Daubert or
“not fatally flawed” standard.206 This practice of requiring more evidence at an early stage is appropriate given the considerable effect that a
class certification has on a case; thus, a court should be able to require
more from the plaintiff at the precertification stage to prove that all the
FRCP 23 requirements have been met. In re Hydrogen strongly favors
an early and aggressive defense strategy designed to marshal compelling
203. Id. (discussing Allen v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 358 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2004)).
204. See id. at 574–75, 580–82.
205. Cooley Godward Kronish, L.L.P., Third Circuit Clarifies the “Rigorous Analysis” Inquiry District Courts Are to Conduct in Deciding Motions for Class Certification, COOLEY ALERT!,
Feb. 2009, http://www.cooley.com/files/ALERT_ClassCertRigAnalysis.pdf.
206. Klein et al., supra note 11.
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fact and expert testimony that demonstrates the FRCP 23 factors cannot
be met.207
Also, the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard gives district
courts greater discretion to resolve factual issues at the precertification
stage of the case. This greater discretion may result in more extensive
prediscovery and pretrial evidentiary hearings in order for the court to
have all the information necessary to make a decision on the FRCP 23
requirements. Thus, district courts are reluctant to make a determination
based solely on motion papers. But if the district court is given greater
latitude to resolve conflicting expert testimony by utilizing other tools,
such as discovery, to resolve any conflicting reports, then the potential
for premature class certification can be reduced.208 Given the broad inquiry required by courts under such an approach, it may be difficult for
defendants to limit class discovery at an early stage in the case. Yet,
even with these increased discovery costs, ultimately, it is cost effective
for a defendant to contest class certification early rather than fight for a
class action to be decertified and be unsuccessful.
Finally, In re Hydrogen is likely to influence the Supreme Court
because the majority opinion was authored by Chief Judge Anthony J.
Scirica,209 who is a leading figure in civil procedure and oversaw extensive revisions to FRCP 23 during his role as chair of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. In his decision, Chief Judge
Scirica relied on the 2003 Amendments to FRCP 23.210 The 2003
amendments eliminated the previous language that class certification
“may be conditional” and granted on a tentative basis.211 The revised
language now provides for a more thorough evaluation of the FRCP 23
requirements at this earlier stage and the revisions clarified that FRCP 23
neither requires nor encourages premature certification decisions.212
These revisions are also consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes
to the 2003 amendments, which state that “[a]ctive judicial supervision
may be required to achieve the most effective balance that expedites an
informed certification determination without forcing an artificial and ul-

207. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30.
208. Jeffrey J. Greenbaum & Stuart M. Feinblatt, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit’s
‘Acid Test’ for Class Certification, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. 52 (Apr. 2009).
209. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d 305, 306 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Klein et al., supra note
11.
210. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 318–20; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s
notes on 2003 amendments.
211. Hydrogen Peroxide II, 552 F.3d at 319.
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes on 2003 amendments.
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timately wasteful division between ‘certification discovery’ and ‘merits
discovery.’”213
Although the Third Circuit’s approach in In re Hydrogen requires
district courts to apply the highest rigorous analysis standard for class
certification, the potential effects from its decision have not been fully
realized. It is possible that courts may opt for a somewhat less rigorous
standard, like that established in In re IPO, which appears to strike a
middle ground between In re Hydrogen and Dukes. Yet it seems unlikely that future district courts will follow the reasoning in Dukes by allowing certification on mere intent to prove a case based on questionable
expert testimony, which is “replete with conjecture.”214 Which standard
will be the leading view remains to be seen given the recent Ninth Circuit decision affirming class certification.
V. THE NEED FOR SUPREME COURT INVOLVEMENT AND CLARIFICATION
The Supreme Court should adopt the Third Circuit’s high rigorous
analysis standard in order to curb misuse of class actions and ensure fairness for all injured plaintiffs. Rigorous analysis must include a preliminary inquiry into and the resolution of the issues to determine that the
FRCP 23 requirements have been met before certifying a class.215 The
need for a clearly defined rigorous analysis standard by the Supreme
Court is long overdue. Although different courts have articulated various
versions of what such a “rigorous review” might look like, the Supreme
Court has not spoken authoritatively on the issue.216
Regardless of liability, the threat of a class action is enough to force
many defendants to settle a lawsuit rather than risk a trial. “As a result,
the key event and driver of risk and exposure in class actions continues
to be the court’s decision on whether to certify a class.”217 Class action
trials are less common given the financial and reputational effects at
213. Id.
214. James J. Oh, Dukes v. Wal-Mart: A Foreboding Class Certification Decision for Employers, ASAP, July 2004, http://www.littler.com/PressPublications/Documents/11259.pdf.
215. At a minimum, the Supreme Court needs to establish clear standards for a rigorous analysis and the level of a court’s involvement in resolving conflicting expert testimony. While not ideal,
the Supreme Court may follow the general trend as set forth in In re IPO, which held “that a district
court may—and, depending on the case, must—consider and determine questions relating to the
merits of a case” but without actually resolving such questions. See Haims, D’Amore & McPherson,
supra note 150.
216. Rebecca Justice Lazarus, Discovery Prior to Class Certification: New Considerations and
Challenges, 9 MEALEY’S LITIG. REPORT CLASS ACTIONS 1, 3 (2010).
217. Fourth Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report from Seyfarth Shaw Notes Significant Growth in High Stakes Litigation at State Court Levels, SEYFARTH SHAW, L.L.P., PRESS &
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2008 http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/2a69ffe5-df15-475f-a78ada0661200731_documentupload.pdf.
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stake for the defendants.218 “Class actions are [also] the litigation industry’s weapons of choice because they aggregate so many claims—
hundreds, thousands, or (as in the [Dukes] case) even millions—even the
largest companies are forced to settle or face potential bankruptcy.”219
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit, in upholding Dukes’s class certification,
skimmed past the impact of such settlement pressure: “[n]early every
circuit to consider the issue, including our own, has recognized the practical importance of the certification decision as leverage for settlement,
yet [FRCP] 23 gives neither party the right to turn the certification decision into a trial.”220 Often, the numbers are so large that the merits of the
case mean little because the expense of litigating the claim and the potentially high verdict in the event of loss can give the plaintiffs’ attorneys a
very strong hand despite their weak legal position.221 These class action
settlements and jury awards cost hundreds of millions of dollars—costs
that must be recovered through higher prices for goods and services,
which ultimately affect the economy as a whole.222
The Supreme Court should clarify the standards in class actions to
avoid certification issues as highlighted in cases like Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
which potentially deprive victims of the protection of laws and deny defendants their due process rights.223 The district court in Dukes described
the outcome as “rough justice,” proclaiming that it was “better than the
alternative of no remedy at all for any class member.”224 But there is a
better approach—the Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard. Even
though this standard may result in a suit not being certified as a class action, a remedy is still available for actual victims of injury without sacrificing due process for defendants.
Class actions continue to be a primary exposure, which drives corporate legal expenditures and supports the need for Supreme Court involvement. In addition, the current struggles in the economy appear to
fuel class action lawsuits that result in inconsistent rulings due to the lack
of a clear standard. Class actions continue to be filed across many substantive areas of the law.225 Without a clear standard set forth by the Su-

218. Mark Moller, The Anti-Constitutional Culture of Class Action Law, CATO INST., Summer
2007, at 52.
219. Copland, supra note 199.
220. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 591 (9th Cir. 2010).
221. Copland, supra note 199.
222. California Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse (CALA), Class Action Abuse, CALA.COM,
http://www.cala.com/issues/class-action (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
223. Eric S. Dreiband, Willie Sutton was a Piker, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at A7.
224. Id. (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 177 (N.D. Cal. 2004)).
225. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30.
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preme Court, the varying and sometimes conflicting circuit standards
will continue.
Due to the lack of a clearly articulated rigorous analysis standard
and splits among the circuit courts, attorneys have found other legal avenues to pursue class action issues. For example, in recent years, the
Class Action Fairness Act (the Act) has continued to play a significant
role in class action suits in evolving case law developments, including
creative plaintiff strategies to prevent the effectiveness of the Act.226
Moreover, President Barack Obama’s administration adopted a more
protective view of workers’ rights than the Bush administration, including increased funding for several government and enforcement agencies,
which could directly affect the future of class action suits because these
agencies are able to bring suits on behalf of injured parties.227
The stakes of class action litigation can be significant and the financial risks enormous. When certified as class actions based on a lenient rigorous analysis standard, the result is an unfair advantage to the
plaintiffs. The potential for massive settlements (in Dukes for example)
increases the financial stakes as plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to push the
envelope to craft damages theories to expand the size of classes and the
scope of recoveries.228 Additionally, class actions adversely affect the
market share of a corporation and its reputation in the marketplace.229
Even if cases are never actually certified, the possibility of the litigation
expanding into a formal class action raises the stakes significantly, perhaps requiring a more aggressive defense or resulting in a settlement on
an individual basis at a premium.230 Not only for judicial efficiency reasons, but also for economic reasons, the Supreme Court’s immediate involvement is needed, and a clear standard has been established by the
Third Circuit that can and should be adopted. The Third Circuit’s rigorous analysis standard is an appropriate balance between providing plaintiffs access to the judicial system to seek redress and providing appropriate protections to defendants against unsupported class action motions.
Additionally, Supreme Court involvement is necessary because
class certification decisions can also be “susceptible to two sources of
226. Coyle, supra note 145. “While many multi-state cases are being pushed into the federal
system, the plaintiffs’ bar has responded to CAFA by filing ‘single state’ class suits to avoid
CAFA’s removal provisions.” Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30.
227. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30.
228. Seyfarth Shaw’s Fifth Annual Workplace Class Action Litig. Report Shows Financial
Stakes in Workplace Class Action Litig. Continue to Surge, SEYFARTH SHAW, L.L.P., PRESS
RELEASE, Jan. 13, 2009 http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/news_item/67a01808-3b3f-4c99-bd6fbf48d5f0a9ce_documentupload.pdf.
229. Moller, supra note 218.
230. Year-End Update on Class Actions, supra note 30.
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bias: political bias and bias that stems from [the] courts’ own self-interest
in docket clearance.”231 First, loose certification standards are “vulnerable to trial judges’ political biases” because they require little of a judge
in evaluating the merits of the FRCP 23 requirements.232 Additionally,
some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, discern from FRCP 23’s vague
text a basis for ignoring Daubert entirely when assessing whether certification of a class action is proper based on expert testimony.233 Because
FRCP 23’s text points in different directions, it invites exploitation by
judges who would prefer to ignore the Daubert standard entirely.234
Even if political ideology is not a source of bias, trial courts remain
at risk of bias in class action suits because they have a material interest in
promoting certification for one simple reason: certification promotes
docket clearance.235 Rule 23 “directs that certification decisions should
be made ‘at an early practicable time’ and, in design, forces certification
decisions to be made before a trial of the case.”236 “Based on this, a
number of courts, including the Ninth Circuit panel that decided Dukes,
have held that consideration of the ‘merits’ is entirely off-limits at the
class certification stage.”237 “Daubert is a merits-based inquiry because
it relates to the admissibility of evidence at trial; therefore, these courts
argue that a full-blown Daubert analysis is premature at the class certification stage.”238 Yet the Third Circuit’s articulation of a rigorous analysis requiring plaintiffs to present a preponderance of evidence that the
FRCP 23 requirements are met would reduce the number of courts that
apply their own inconsistent standards to expert testimony.

231. Moller, supra note 218, at 53.
232. Id. For example, a trial judge with a “strong aversion to large corporations might . . . want
to punish big corporate interests, ‘sending a message’ that they must respect the little
guy. . . . Conversely, a pro-business trial judge might want to go out of the way to deny class certification of meritorious claims.” Id.
233. Id. at 54.
234. Id.
235. Id. “Dockets are congested because of the explosion of statutes and because of the modern rules that govern when legal issues can be litigated more than once (called ‘preclusion’). The
explosion of vague, overlapping laws gives plaintiffs many potential vehicles for prosecuting complaints against a defendant. . . . At the same time, modern rules of ‘preclusion’ apply more strictly to
defendants than plaintiffs. A defendant who loses a lawsuit against one plaintiff typically cannot relitigate his [or her] failed defenses against a different plaintiff asserting similar claims.” Id. at 54–
55.
236. Id. at 54.
237. Id.
238. Id. Yet this reading is not the only one “because other portions of Rule 23 point in an
opposite direction. . . . Judge Frank Easterbrook notes, ‘if some of the [other] considerations under
Rule 23(b)(3), such as “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action,”
overlap the merits—as they do . . . where it is not possible to evaluate impending difficulties without
[a merits-based inquiry]—then the judge must make a preliminary inquiry into the merits.’” Id.
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More recently, there appears to be change on the horizon—the
Ninth Circuit demonstrated a willingness to take a step back in the defense-oriented ruling Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.239 In Vinole, class certification was denied in an action for failure to pay overtime brought by current and former Countrywide external home loan
consultants.240 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding,
which denied class certification where no rule or decisional authority
prohibited the defendants from filing their motion to deny certification
before the plaintiffs filed their motion to certify the class.241 A district
court, the Ninth Circuit noted, “must take into consideration all factors in
favor of, or against, class certification.”242 Moreover, “the overarching
focus remains whether trial by class representation would further the
goals of efficiency and judicial economy.”243 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had conducted a proper inquiry into the
FRCP 23 requirements and did not abuse its discretion in deciding not to
certify the proposed class. The decision confirmed that a defendant is
entitled to bring a motion under FRCP 23 advocating that a class action
should not be certified.244 The willingness of the Ninth Circuit to affirm
in favor of defendants is important in the class action context because
this decision is consistent with the idea of a court taking a more involved
role in the class certification process.
In summary, the need for Supreme Court involvement and articulation of a rigorous analysis standard is needed. The Supreme Court
should adopt the high rigorous analysis standard set forth in In re Hydrogen.
VI. CONCLUSION
Class action certification has gained significant media attention and
raised widespread debate in light of the recent Dukes v. Wal-Mart and In
re Hydrogen cases. While the sheer magnitude of the Dukes certified
class alone may draw Supreme Court attention, the Court cannot continue to ignore this issue due to the continued struggle among the lower
239. Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Caroline
McDonald, More Claims, Bigger Exposures Likely for Employers in 2010, NATIONAL
UNDERWRITER
PROPERTY
&
CASUALTY,
Jan.
25,
2010,
http://www.propertycasualty.com/News/2010/1/Pages/More-Claims-Bigger-Exposures-Likely-For-Employers-in2010.aspx.
240. Vinole, 571 F.3d at 942.
241. Id. The court also found that denial was proper when the plaintiffs had ample time to
prepare and present their certification argument. Id. at 942–43.
242. Georgene Vairo, Motion to Deny Class Certification: Georgene Vairo on Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 4479, 4 (Oct. 15, 2009).
243. Id.
244. See Vinole, 571 F.3d at 941.
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courts regarding certification standards. Thus, Supreme Court involvement is necessary to finally and clearly articulate what constitutes a “rigorous analysis.”
The Third Circuit has defined a standard for a district court’s rigorous analysis that includes a preliminary inquiry and resolution of merit
issues that are necessary to determine FRCP 23 requirements for class
certification. The need for a clear standard is evident from the sheer volume of class action litigation. In order to preserve judicial efficiency
and fairness across jurisdictions, a single, national standard is required.
The Third Circuit standard strikes the appropriate balance between judicial access for plaintiffs and due process rights of the defendants and
provides an ideal model standard for the Supreme Court.

